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THE COCONSPIRATOR EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE:
THE LIMITS OF ITS LOGIC
"Conspiracy" evokes images of political intrigue and financial
manipulation, but far more often enters the courtroom in trials of ordinary
crimes allegedly committed by more than one. While doctrinal and judi-
cial attention generally focuses upon the substantive law of conspiracy, its
procedural "adjuncts" have come to be of greater practical importance.1
The pre-eminence of procedure over substance is due to their severance;
rules designed to offset the problems peculiar to prosecution of con-
spiracies have been allowed to invade the general criminal law.2 This
comment will examine perhaps the most notorious of these misbegotten
devices, the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule.
Origins
The general common law coconspirator exception provides that acts3
and declarations of a conspirator made in furtherance, and during the
1. Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1137,
1141 (1973). Regarding the theory that procedure follows substance, compare Van
Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961, 967 (2d Cir. 1926) (L. Hand, J.) ("Such
declarations are admitted upon no doctrine of the law of evidence, but of the
substantive law of crime.") with Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 83 n.14 (1970)
(Georgia had the procedural rules without a separate substantive crime of conspira-
cy at the time of trial).
2. It is argued with occasional success that the coconspirator exception ap-
plies only in conspiracy prosecutions. State v. Gunter, 208 La. 694, 23 So. 2d 305
(1945); State v. Smith, 194 La. 1015, 195 So. 2d 523 (1940); State v. Carroll, 31 La.
Ann. 860 (1879) (E.D. Whi(e, J.) ("too elementary to require reasoning"). Logically
this is the superior view because the declarations lack inherent probative value, and
"necessity," the true basis for the exception, exists only in conspiracy trials, where
the crime is inherently difficult to prove. Nevertheless, the overwhelming weight of
authority is to the contrary. E.g., Park v. Huff, 506 F.2d 849, 859 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 824 (1975); State v. Cryer, 262 La. 575, 263 So. 2d 895 (1972); C.
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 268 at 646 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
MCCORMICK]. Even in conspiracy trials the exception makes little sense because
the crime that the declarations are admitted to prove is the conspiracy upon which
their admission is premised. The 1975 amendment to Code of Criminal Procedure
article 493 renders the question less important by allowing joinder of conspiracy
and the basic offense in a single indictment.
3. Acts are not within the scope of the hearsay rule (see note 26, infra) and
thus do not require an exception; the only criterion should be relevancy. Lutwak v.
United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953) (acts not within federal coconspirator excep-
tion). Even where so codified, to require that acts meet the requirements of the
exception would be to exclude them in all other situations. Clearly this was not the
legislative intent. Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L.
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pendency, of the conspiracy are admissible against all other conspirators,
provided there is independent evidence of the conspiracy. The origins of
the exception are nearly as ancient as those of the hearsay rule itself.4 Not
until the early 1500's did technical rules of evidence begin to develop, as
oral testimony in open court became the predominant mode of proof.5
Until then juries had gathered "evidence" independently, requiring only
that the witnesses have personally observed the facts related. While the
hearsay rule is not the same as this requirement of firsthand knowledge (as
the witness who testifies to hearsay did observe the declarant's state-
ment), 6 it is a logical extension. For once it is accepted that the absent
declarant is the person upon whose observation the jury must rely, it
becomes clear that the hearsay witness in no meaningful sense possesses
firsthand knowledge. Hearsay was thus for nearly two centuries received
with increasing suspicion crystallizing into a general rule of exclusion in
the last quarter of the seventeenth century.
7
That the crimes of one conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy
are imputable to all was established in the common law as early as 1600.8
It was apparently upon this premise that the coconspirator rule originally
developed. In order to prove the scope of the entire conspiracy, and thus
determine the seriousness of the crime, 9 it was necessary to admit evi-
dence of the acts and declarations of other conspirators in the trial of each
of them. 10 Some hearsay may have been admitted under this theory," I but
REV. 920, 988 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law]. Louisiana
courts, like most, refer to the exception only when admitting evidence of the acts.
E.g., State v. Chavers, 294 So. 2d 489 (La. 1974); State v. Smith, 193 La. 706, 192
So. 2d 106 (1939).
4. See 9 W. HOLDSWORTH. A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 214 (1926); 5 J.
WIGMORE. EVIDENCE § 1364 at 12-28 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) [hereinafter cited a 5
WIGMORE].
5. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 244 at 579-80; 5 WIGMORE, supra note 4, §
1364 at 15.
6. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 247 at 586-87.
7. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1364 at 18.
8. Trial of Sir Christopher Blunt, 1 How. St. Tr. 1410, 1412 (1600).
9. Most of these trials were for high treason (endangering the life of the king),
with conspiracy fulfilling the overt act requirement, and thus it was necessary to
show that the object of the conspiracy was to overthrow the king. See R. v. Stone,
101 Eng. Rep. 684 (1796).
10. E.g., Trial of Lord George Gordon, 21 How. St. Tr. 485, 535 (1781) (cries of
"No Popery" to show mob's intent); Trial of Daniel Dammaree, 15 How. St. Tr.
521, 552-53 (1710) (discussion of plan among unknown persons in mob); Trial of
Lord Viscount Stafford, 7 How. St. Tr. 1217, 1309 (1678) (evidence of acts of the
principal Papists, unconnected to defendant).
11. E.g., Trial of William Lord Russell, 9 How. St. Tr. 578, 607 (1683). See the
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no hearsay exception was discussed by the courts because the cocon-
spirators' extrajudicial acts and declarations were admitted solely to estab-
lish the nature and scope of the conspiracy-a non-assertive use. 12
Not until the 1790's, in a series of English treason trials, was the
coconspirator rule articulated as an exception to the exclusionary rule
against hearsay.1 3 Setting out the elements of the exception as they exist
even today, 4 the court made reference to the agency relationship among
the coconspirators,' 5 but relied upon the theory of res gestae, thus charac-
terizing the declarations as acts, or as declarations accompanying acts, in
furtherance of the conspiracy. 6 The exception was recognized by the
United States Supreme Court in 1827 without further clarification of its
basis. 17 Determination of the rule's actual theoretical underpinning is of
more than historical interest. Its basis in law will decide which elements
need be stressed most, whether the exception should be narrowly or
expansively interpreted, and indeed, whether it should exist at all.
Foundation
The coconspirator rule has thus far been discussed as an exception to
the hearsay rule, suggesting subjection to the same scrutiny applied to all
other exceptions. But before discussing the exception's relation to the
hearsay rule it is necessary to contend with the argument that there is no
relation. The Federal Rules of Evidence maintain the effect of the excep-
remarks of Justice Buller in Trial of Thomas Hardy, 24 How. St. Tr. 200, 451-)2,
476-77 (1794).
12. Most were non-assertive statements anyway (see note 10, supra), and even
the cries of the mob's intentions are non-hearsay under the theory of Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Hillmon, 145 U.S. 285 (1892).
13. R. v. Stone, 101 Eng. Rep. 684 (1796); Trial of Home Tooke, 25 How. St.
Tr. 1 (1794); Trial of Thomas Hardy, 24 How. St. Tr. 200 (1794). See Levie,
Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1159, 1162 (1954).
14. See, e.g., R. v. Stone, 101 Eng. Rep. 684, 685 (1796) (requirements of
furtherance and a foundation discussed). Omission of "pendency" is of no conse-
quence; see the text following note 76, infra.
15. The conspirators were officers of a Society whose purpose had allegedly
shifted from political reform to sedition.
16. "[Tlhe writing here is an act, and it is such an act as may show the extent of
the plan ..... Trial of Thomas Hardy, 24 How. St. Tr. 200, 477 (1794). See S.
PHILLIPPs, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 73-74 (1816) [hereinafter cited as
PHILLIPPS].
17. United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 459 (1827). The cocon-
spirator was an employee of the defendant and made the declarations in connection
with an act within his authority, which act was also a part of the crime. The Court




tion under the traditional theory of vicarious admissions but classify it as
non-hearsay. 8 The doctrine that coconspirators' declarations are vicarious
admissions is based on the agency theory of conspiracy. Upon entering
into the scheme, each conspirator is deemed to authorize the others to act
for him in furtherance of the common plan. The Advisory Committee's
comments recognize this agency as "at best a fiction" but bow to the
weight of tradition. '9 For the reasons that follow, this reclassification does
not remove the ills of hearsay, but ignores them.
20
Hearsay is generally excluded because of three deficiencies: it is not
given under oath, the trier of fact cannot view the declarant's demeanor,
and there is no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. The first two
considerations, oath and demeanor, are dispensable, since neither their
absence nor presence is sufficient to determine admissibility. 2' Cross-
examination is the essential element because it allows the trier of fact to
ascertain the declarant's sincerity and memory, the accuracy of his percep-
tion, and whether he adequately conveyed his intended meaning. 2 2 Admis-
sions are subject to these shortcomings of hearsay to the same extent as the
out-of-court statements of non-parties; therefore their exception from the
operation of the rule must be supported by policy considerations of
overriding dimensions.
The reasoning underlying reception of admissions despite their hear-
say character is unsatisfactory due, perhaps, to their having become
acceptedbefore crystallization of the rule against hearsay. 23 Early writers
relied on the then-existing testimonial incompetency of parties to justify
admissibility.2 4 It has since been suggested that all admissions be received
18. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E): "A statement is not hearsay if ... offered
against a party and is . . .a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy."
19. FED. R. EVID. 801, Adv. Comm. Note, 46 F.R.D. 341 (1969). Cf. id. at 339
("apparently prevalent satisfaction" with admissions cited as support for Rule 801).
20. Res gestae is also often invoked by the courts, e.g., State v. Nix, 327 So. 2d
301, 330-33 (La. 1975), though its broad use had been discredited by the commen-
tators. E.g., Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res
Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229, 231 (1922). Clearly res gestae is not applicable to
coconspirators' statements as a class, because they are admissible only against, and
not in favor of, the defendant and are used to prove the truth of the matter asserted,
not to explain an ambiguous material act, 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1078 at 170
(Chadbourn rev. 1972) [hereinafter cited as 4 WIGMORE].
21. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 4, §§ 1362 at 3, 1395 at 150-54.
22. Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in
Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1378 (1972).
23. See Morgan, Admissions, I U.C.L.A. L. REV. 18 (1953).
24. PHILLIPPS, supra note 16, at 71; 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 575-77 at 674-
1104 [Vol. 37
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as the relevant conduct of the party .25 To the extent that they are non-
assertive, and thus not hearsay, this is undoubtedly correct. Beyond this
point, it is in direct contravention of the policies that exclude hearsay.
26
Wigmore also considers admissions non-hearsay when offered against the
declarant party, finding the hearsay rule "satisfied" because "he himself
is in that case the only one to invoke the hearsay rule and because he does
not need to cross-examine himself." 2 7 The declarant has the opportunity
to take the stand and explain the assertion. 28 In view of the release of
admissions from the operation of all other circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness 29 and in light of the fifth amendment privilege not to take
the stand, this argument should be of little weight in criminal cases.
Clearly it cannot apply when the "admission" is that of a coconspirator,
whose right to claim the fifth amendment privilege is beyond the defend-
ant's control.
The dominant approach, apparently based on notions of estoppel, 30 is
the adversary theory of litigation: 3' "A party can hardly object that he had
no opportunity to cross-examine himself or that he is unworthy of cre-
dence save when speaking under sanction of oath." 32 Whatever its merits
in civil cases,33 injection of the adversary theory into evidentiary rules is
95 (3d ed. 1940). Even then this made little sense if the party had no personal
knowledge or if there were other sources available for the same evidence. Com-
ment, The Hearsay Exception for Co-Conspirators' Declarations, 25 U. CHI. L.
REV. 530, 532-33 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Hearsay Exception]. Parties are no
longer testimonially incompetent. LA. R.S. 15:461 (1950).
25. Strahorn, A Reconsideration of the Hearsay Rule and Admissions, 85 U.
PA. L. REV. 484, 488 (1937).
26. Even non-verbal assertive conduct is subject to the hearsay rule. The only
question is as to non-verbal conduct not intended to communicate. 5 WIGMORE,
supra note 4, § 1362 at 3 n.1.
27. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 1048 at 4 (emphasis by the author).
28. Id. This is apparently not the historical reason since parties were incompe-
tent; even today they may be privileged.
29. The requirements of personal knowledge, competency, voluntariness, (see
Slough, Confessions and Admissions, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 96 (1959)), and the
prohibition of opinion and self-serving statements do not apply to admissions.
Morgan, Admissions, 12 WASH. L. REV. 181, 182 (1937).
30. Cf. Lev, The Law of Vicarious Admissions-An Estoppel, 26 U. CINN. L.
REV. 17 (1957).
31. FED. R. EvID. 801, Adv. Comm. Note, 46 F.R.D. 161, 351 (1969); McCOR-
MICK, supra note 2, § 262 at 629; Morgan, Admissions, 1 U.C.L.A. REV. 18, 19
(1953).
32. Morgan, Admissions, 1 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 18, 19 (1953).
33. Hearsay Exception, supra note 24, at 532 ("game theory" inappropriate for
statements made prior to litigation).
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of doubtful propriety in criminal cases. 34 This view that a party, having
made a statement, is best able to explain or refute it becomes attenuated
when statements of an agent are deemed admissions but retains some of its
logic when limited to statements concerning those acts which the agent is
expressly authorized to do, especially when it will merely impose civil
liability upon the principal. When vicarious admissions are extended to a
criminal conspiracy prosecution the logic evaporates. State interests
against conspiracy should not be advanced by treating alleged conspirators
unfairly.35 Conspiracies are so broadly defined that even actual con-
spirators need not know of each other,3 6 and the degree of control over
coconspirators does not approximate that inherent in a true agency.
Despite disagreement on the proper basis for reception of admissions,
commentators are uniform in implicit recognition that none of the tradi-
tional bases for accepting admissions provides a foundation for vicarious
admissions. 37 Instead, early writers claimed that the liability for the acts of
another established under the substantive law provides "equal reason" for
receiving admissions that would be evidence against the other. 38 That this
merely restates the question as a conclusion has been demonstrated else-
where. 39 In cases like the early English treason trials 4° where, a conspiracy
34. Cf. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose
favorable material evidence to defendant).
35. "It is one thing to say that because we hate all conspirators, we will treat
conspirators especially harshly. But it is quite another to say that because we hate
conspirators, we will treat harshly everyone accused of conspiracy." Davenport,
supra note 22, at 1390-91.
36. The defendant need not know the other conspirators, the scope of the
conspiracy, nor what acts have or will be done in furtherance thereof by others. All
conspirators are criminally liable for the substantive offenses of any other con-
spirator that are committed in furtherance of, or could be "reasonably foreseen as a
necessary or natural consequence of, the unlawful agreement." Pinkerton v.
United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946). See Park v. Huff, 506 F.2d 849 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824 (1975); Klein, Conspiracy-The Prosecutor's Darling, 24
BROOKLYN L. REV. 1 (1957).
37. The two are always accorded separate treatment. E.g., MCCORMICK, supra
note 2, § 267 at 639-647; 4 WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 1069 at 100.
38. 4 WIGMORE. supra note 20, § 1077 at 158. See Trial of Thomas Hardy, 24
How. St. Tr. 200, 474 (1794) (Eyre, L.C.J.); Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961
(2d Cir. 1926) (L. Hand, J.).
Ironically, while Wigmore attributed the coconspirator exception to the vicari-
ous liability among conspirators for substantive offenses, the Supreme Court has
since drawn upon the coconspirator exception to support the vicarious liability.
Pinkerton v. United States. 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946).
39. See MCCORMICK. supra note 2, § 267 at 641; Morgan, The Rationale of
Vicarious Admissions, 42 HARV. L. REV. 461, 469-70 (1929).
40. See the text at note 9, supra.
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having been proven, evidence of the acts of the other conspirators is
necessary to determine the degree of the offense, the stated justification
holds. But where the offense has been completed, and especially where no
conspiracy is charged, the substantive law of complicity should have no
evidential consequence. In support of the stated theory, Wigmore points
out that the admissions of one with identical interests have the same
probative value as the admissions of the party himself.4 ' However, it is
nowhere even asserted that the party's admissions have any inherent
probative value. 42
To its credit, Wigmore's rationale is equally applicable to cocon-
spirators' declarations and vicarious admissions in general. This is where
the current basis for vicarious admissions, or representative admissions as
they are now called, falls short. While agency has replaced the discredited
vicarious liability rationale,43 the agency relationship which places an
agent's statements in the principal's mouth is but a fiction in the substan-
tive law of conspiracy. Coconspirators' declarations have been unques-
tioningly treated as representative admissions merely because they were
historically viewed as vicarious admissions.
So much energy is expended seeking to place admissions beyond the
scope of hearsay because the indicia of reliability characteristic of excep-
tions to the hearsay rule do not inhere in admissions as a class. 44 Nonethe-
less, they are generally considered to be hearsay exceptions 45 and as such
constitute the only exception not based on trustworthiness and necessity.46
Vicarious admissions, to the extent that they are within the scope of an
express agency,47 fit within the "adversary theory of litigation," whatever
its merits, for they are in effect adopted by the principal. Reception of a
coconspirator's declarations cannot logically be founded upon this, or any
other, theory of admissions or vicarious admissions.
There is little ground for attributing any trustworthiness to statements
of conspirators, particularly when they implicate another. 48 Such state-
41. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 1077 at 160.
42. See Morgan, The Rationale of Vicarious Admissions, 42 HARV. L. REV.
461, 469-70 (1929).
43. E.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 267 at 640.
44. Morgan, Admissions, 12 WASH. L. REV. 181 (1937). That admissions are
evidence against, but not for, the declarant is proof of this.
45. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 262 at 629 n.7.
46. FED. R. EVID. 803(24) and 804(5) require that future exceptions possess
trustworthiness and necessity "equivalent" to that of existing ones.
47. Not just a "speaking agent," but anyone expressly authorized to do the act
discussed.
48. Levie, supra note 13, at 1165. The writer draws a distinction between
19771 1107
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ments may often be motivated by a desire to shift the blame, or to create a
particular impression on the listener by claiming another's support or
authority. While the requirement that the declaration be in furtherance of
the conspiracy perhaps prevents complete repudiation of the hearsay rule,
any statement in furtherance of a criminal scheme is inherently unreliable,
absent traditional guarantees of trustworthiness, due to the obvious danger
of insincerity.4 9 Moreover, the claim that the statements are necessary is
based on the difficulty of proving a secretive inchoate crime. 50 Trials of
completed crimes fall outside the scope of this argument, and in conspira-
cy trials the coconspirator's declarations cannot be used until after the
conspiracy has been established, rendering them superfluous.
The substantive law of conspiracy imposes harsh penalties on con-
spirators no matter how slight their involvement. 51 State interests behind
conspiracy laws-deterrence of group efforts at crime, and punishment of
inchoate offenses falling short of attempt-are amply served thereby. The
risk of wrongful conviction incidental to the slight measure of proof
required should not be heightened by evidentiary rules not founded upon
trustworthiness. Nor should the necessity for such evidence supplant the
requirement of reliability. Necessity is required in addition to trustworthi-
ness because hearsay is repugnant to our system of justice.52 Indeed, the
fact of necessity demonstrates that the evidence will be heavily relied
upon, thus increasing the dangers inherent in its use.
53
The coconspirator exception should be abandoned and such declara-
tions admitted only if they fall within another recognized exception to the
hearsay rule. The exception for declarations against penal interest, recent-
ly recognized in Louisiana, 54 and those for spontaneous or excited utter-
"declarations showing the existence of a conspiracy and declarations concerning its
membership or aims," and would admit only the former.
49. It has been suggested that this evidence is easily fabricated by the prosecu-
tion (Hearsay Exception, supra note 24, at 541), but good faith prosecutions run the
same risk if an alleged conspirator has turned state's witness and wants to bolster
his testimony in the hope of receiving greater leniency.
50. Levie, supra note 13.
51. See note 36, supra.
52. See note 46, supra.
53. Hearsay Exception, supra note 24, at 541.
54. State v. Gilmore, 332 So. 2d 789 (La. 1976). See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3); 5
WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1477 at 360 n.7 (trend toward acceptance in other states).
The unavailability requirement of this exception often will be satisfied by the
declarant's claim of the fifth amendment privilege. California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 168 n.17 (1970); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 420 (1965); State v.
Herman, 304 So. 2d 322, 323 (La. 1974). Professor Morgan suggests that unavaila-
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ances may often be properly applicable." However, in Louisiana, as in
most states, the coconspirators' exception is imposed by statute.56 Until
legislative repeal it remains the duty of the courts to exact strict com-
pliance with the statutory limitations of the exception-unless, of course,
the Constitution requires more.
Constitutionality
The relationship between the hearsay rule and the confrontation
clause is the subject of ongoing debate among courts and commentators.
The origin of the hearsay rule is well established,57 but the intent of the
framers of the sixth amendment is unknown. 58 Some claim that the
confrontation clause was merely "intended to regulate trial procedure,"
requiring only that such testimony as is admissible under rules of evidence
be given subject to cross-examination and in the presence of the accused.59
Abuses of evidentiary law, including the hearsay rule, would thus be
subject to constitutional restraint only under the due process clause.6 °
Several United States Supreme Court decisions in the 1960's created
the impression that, in the absence of a traditional exception to the hearsay
rule, the confrontation clause demands cross-examination of the declarant
at trial. 61 Perhaps in reaction to scholarly criticism 62 and recognition that
bility should not be required. Morgan, The Rationale of Vicarious Admissions, 42
HARV. L. REV. 461, 481 (1929).
55. E.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970).
56. LA. R.S. 15:455 (1950), quoted in the text at note 76, infra.
57. See note 4, supra.
58. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
59. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1397 at 158-59. Justice Harlan adopted this
position in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 94 (1970) (concurring). Six months earlier
he had been of the view that the confrontation clause required cross-examination
only of available witnesses and the exercise of due diligence by the prosecution to
produce its witnesses. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 186 (1970) (concurring).
Recanting in Dutton, he recognized that this would abolish useful and reliable
exceptions such as those for business records and scientific reports.
60. For criticism of this due process analysis, see Comment, Hearsay and
Confrontation: Can the Criminal Defendant's Rights Be Preserved Under A Bifur-
cated Standard?, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 243, 270 n.154 (1975).
61. E.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Barber v. Page, 390
U.S. 719 (1968); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965). There are very few earlier confrontation cases because of the
paucity of federal criminal trials and the unavailability of the clause to state
defendants before Pointer. See Read, The New Confrontation-Hearsay Dilemma,
45 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1972).
62. E.g., Comment, Federal Confrontation: A Not Very Clear Say On Hear-
say, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 366 (1966); Note, 75 YALE L.J. 1434 (1966).
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"constitutionalization" of one of the most unsatisfactory areas in evidence
law could be the end result, the jurisprudence shifted radically in 1970. In
Dutton v. Evans, 63 a plurality of the Court found the evidentiary rule and
the constitutional clause to be overlapping rather than coextensive and
introduced a new test for determining the constitutionality of hearsay
exceptions. They held that the confrontation clause was satisfied, though
the declarant had never been cross-examined, by hearsay possessed of
sufficient "indicia of reliability" if the evidence was not crucial to the
state's case or devastating to defendant's. Later cases indicate that this
approach has acquired the support of a majority of the Court.64
Dutton is particularly significant because it dealt with evidence
admitted under a state coconspirator exception. Georgia's statutory excep-
tion is extremely broad, covering any statement by a conspirator during
the pendency of the conspiracy,65 and has been interpreted to include a
concealment phase. 66 The Court was careful, however, to limit its holding
to the given application of the exception: 67 the coconspirator's alleged
declaration was spontaneous, against his penal interest, and founded upon
personal knowledge. 68 Despite these indicia of reliability, the Court
stressed the minor role of the hearsay in the state's case,69 and two of the
four-member plurality concurred, finding the hearsay "harmless error if it
was error at all.' '70 This phrase contains the apparent meaning of the
"crucial or devastating" element of the plurality's analysis; so much does
63. 400 U.S. 74 (1970). See also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
64. E.g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972)(8-1 decision). But cf. Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
65. GA. CODE ANN. § 38-306 (1954) (quoted in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 78
(1970)). Furtherance is omitted and pendency is interpreted to include concealment
(all conspirators were in jail at the time of the declaration in Dutton). The founda-
tion is required.
66. A "concealment phase" is an open-ended extension of the pendency of the
conspiracy for as long as the parties are obstructing discovery of the crime.
67. "The Georgia statute can obviously have many applications consistent with
the Confrontation Clause, and we conclude that its application in the circumstances
of this case did not violate the Constitution." 400 U.S. at 87-88.
68. Defendant's coconspirator allegedly told a fellow prisoner, "If it hadn't
been for that dirty. . .Alex Evans [defendant], we wouldn't be in this now." Id. at
77. The statement does not fall within either of the mentioned exceptions because it
was not made during the excitement of the relevant event (the crime) and the
declarant was not unavailable.
69. There were 19 other witnesses, including an eye witness, and the witness
relating the hearsay was thoroughly impeached. Id. at 87.
70. Id. at 90 (Blackmun, J., & Burger, C.J., concurring). Justice Harlan con-
curred on the theory contained at note 59, supra. There were four dissenters.
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the Court wish to avoid grappling with this tar-baby that it will not decide
whether error was committed, only that it would have been harmless. 7'
However little validation Dutton provides for Georgia's statute, the
Court seemingly approved the federal hearsay exception,7 2 the functional
equivalent of Louisiana's. 73 Inculpatory statements admitted without strict
adherence to the elements of the exception run the risk of violating the
defendant's right of confrontation. That such error cannot be cured by
limiting instructions was established in Bruton v, United States. 74 The
coconspirator exception must not be applied in talismanic fashion; the
court should be constantly mindful of its limitations.
Elements
The coconspirator exception in the common law and federal law has
three central elements: pendency, furtherance, and a foundation of inde-
pendent evidence.75 Louisiana's exception, Revised Statutes Title 15,
Section 455, is stated differently but arrives at the same result:
Each coconspirator is deemed to assent to or to commend what-
ever is said or done in furtherance of the common enterprise, -and it is
therefore of no moment that such act was done or such declaration
was made out of the presence of the conspirator sought to be bound
thereby, or whether the conspirator doing such act or making such
declaration be or be not on trial with his codefendant. But to have this
effect a prima facie case of conspiracy must have been established.
76
That the declaration must be made during the pendency of the
conspiracy results from the implied agency theory of conspiracy. Section
71. See id. at 109 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The alternative reading is to vary
the defendant's confrontation rights with the importance of the evidence, even
though that can only be determined after the fact and is a question for the trier of
fact. Whether it was "crucial" should not be confused with whether it was in-
criminating, a question of law.
72. Id. at 80: "[W]e do not question the validity of the coconspirator exception
applied in the federal courts."
73. See the text at note 76, infra.
74. 391 U.S. 123, 128 n.3 (1968). Such evidence is by definition "inadmissible
under traditional rules of evidence" and by no means does it "creep in . . .
inadvertently." Id. at 135.
75. E.g., United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 459 (1827).
76. LA. R.S. 15:455 (1950). It was first enacted in the 1928 Code of Criminal
Procedure and derives from the Common Law. United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 459, 499 (1827); 2 R. MARR, THE CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LouisI-
ANA § 552 (2d ed. 1923) [hereinafter cited as MARR]. The word "commend" should




455 adopts this agency rationale as evidenced by "assent to or com-
mend." The absence of any express reference to pendency is of no
consequence because "furtherance" is in all cases a stricter requirement.
A statement cannot be in furtherance of a non-existent or defunct conspira-
cy. The essence of conspiracy being agreement and the overt acts mere
proof thereof,77 a meeting of the minds should suffice to commence the
conspiracy. As a practical matter this must usually be inferred from the
overt acts.
Establishing the end of the conspiracy necessitates definition of the
common object. At the very least, the parties intend to commit the crime
and elude all hot pursuers. At most, they intend to gain acquittal as well.
The latter extreme, a "concealment phase," has been rejected by
Louisiana 78 and the federal courts, 79 though held not unconstitutional. sO
Early Louisiana cases set the outer limit at "accomplishment or abandon-
ment" 8' but the conspiracy is now held to continue until escape and
division of the proceeds of the crime, if any. 2 While an individual
conspirator may abandon the combination by affirmative act, rendering
subsequent declarations inadmissible as to him, 3 one who joins the
conspiracy in progress does not escape the effect of any declarations made
prior to his joining.8 4
The requirement that the declaration be in furtherance of the common
enterprise is essential to the implied agency rationale. It performs the same
function as "course and scope of employment" in civil agencies, but
should not be interpreted as expansively since there is no express agency
involved.8 5 Since the goal is to admit only those declarations which the
77. Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 624, 629 (1941).
See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 574 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring):
"But the shorter answer is that no overt act is or need be required."
78. State v. Buchanan, 35 La. Ann. 89, 92 (1883).
79. E.g., Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 442 (1949).
80. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 81 (1970).
81. E.g., State v. Buchanan, 35 La. Ann. 89, 92 (1883); State v. Jackson, 29 La.
Ann. 354 (1877).
82. State v. Hodgeson, 305 So. 2d 421 (La. 1974) and State v. McKee, 193 La.
39, 190 So. 325 (1939) (disposition and division); State v. Skeahan, 167 La. 1003, 120
So. 626 (1929) (escape); State v. Bolden, 109 La. 484, 33 So. 571 (1903) (goods
disposed of and proceeds divided). But see State v. Chavers, 294 So. 2d 489 (La.
1974) (day after the crime).
83. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646 (1946).
84. Van Riper v. United States,. 13 F.2d 961, 967 (2d Cir. 1926) (L. Hand, J.).
This strict application of agency principles is criticized in Developments in the Law,
supra note 3, at 923.
85. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E), Adv. Comm. Note, rejecting MODEL CODE
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defendant can be deemed to have authorized, not only must the intended
effect have been to further the common plan, but the content of the
statement should be sufficiently related to the conspiracy to render the
statement foreseeable. The content. will generally be the only evidence of
declarant's purpose and thus should be examined in light of the common
object and the circumstances as they were known to declarant at the time.
There is a tendency in the courts to overlook the requirement of further-
ance86 or to substitute res gestae87 for the analysis of the statement's
purpose and content that section 455 demands. So long as the coconspir-
ator exception exists and is based upon an implied agency, albeit fictitious,
it is essential to the integrity of evidence law and fairness to the defendant
that the requirement of "furtherance" be observed.88
The final element-a foundation of independent evidence - has
created the greatest confusion. The foundation is necessary because the
declarations have only conditional relevance; 89 the state must establish
that there was indeed a conspiracy and that both the defendant and the
declarant were members of it. 90 The very nature of a foundation and the
conditional relevancy of the hearsay require that the evidence be independ-
ent, i.e., evidence other than the hearsay offered under the exception. 91
OF EVID. rule 508(b) and UNIFORM RULE OF EvID. 63(9)(b) which require only that
the declaration be relevant to the conspiracy and made during its pendency; 4 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, COMMENTARY ON RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED
STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 801(d)(2) (E)[011 at 801-143 (1976).
86. The furtherance requirement has in effect been crippled by the oft-cited
misinterpretation: "Anything said or done by co-conspirators in a felonious under-
taking," until disposition or division of the proceeds is admissible against all. State
v. McKee, 193 La. 39, 190 So. 325, 329 (1939) (emphasis added). See, e.g., State v.
Hodgeson, 305 So. 2d 421 (La. 1974); State v. Chavers, 294 So. 2d 489 (La. 1974).
87. E.g., State v; Shepherd, 332 So. 2d 228 (La. 1976); State v. Brumfield, 329
So. 2d 181 (La. 1976); State v. Witherspoon, 292 So. 2d 499 (La. 1974). In State v.
Nix, 327 So. 2d 301 (La. 1975), the state offered statements made by a cocon-
spirator to the driver of the getaway car (witness) describing the break-in and
shooting. The Court found that section 455 was applicable (despite total lack of
furtherance) but relied upon res gestae. As narrations, these statements are ex-
pressly excluded from res gestae by R.S. 15:447 regardless of their spontaneity. See
note 20, supra. The exception for excited utterances might apply, but requires
further analysis.
This use of res gestae is "little more than a test of relevancy." Developments in
the Law, supra note 3, at 986.
88. Levie, supra note 13, at 1167.
89. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 20, § 1079 at 186-87.
90. E.g., State v. Courtney, 170 La. 314, 127 So. 735 (1930); State v. Smith, 30
La Ann. 457, 460 (1878).
91. E.g., 2 MARR, supra note 76, § 552 at 848: "A foundation, however, must
first be laid, aliunde .. "
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Were it otherwise, "hearsay would lift itself by its own bootstraps to the
level of competent evidence." 92
A logical corollary is that the coconspirator's declarations should not
be admitted until the foundation has been established. Otherwise the jury
would be in the position of having to ignore the hearsay when deciding the
guilt or innocence of the accused if no foundation were subsequently
established. It is generally agreed that the judge should decide questions of
fact precedent to the admissibility of evidence even though the jury must
ultimately determine the existence of conspiracy and, thus, the effect of
the hearsay.93
In a series of recent cases, the Louisiana Supreme Court expressly
adopted the traditional view that the judge must find a prima facie case
before the existence of the conspiracy becomes a question for the jury. 94
However, these cases dealt with the propriety of argument and jury
instructions on the law of conspiracy and therefore did not decide whether
evidence could be admitted before the judge's finding of a prima facie
case 95
Early Louisiana decisions were unanimous in requiring that the foun-
dation precede admission of the hearsay. 96 In 1903, the supreme court
recognized the general rule 97 but went on to create the exception which
swallowed the rule: "[W]hen the conspiracy is to be established by
numerous isolated facts" the declarations may be conditionally received
by the jury. 98 Even were this exception valid, it has been applied uncriti-
cally, without regard to the complexity of the facts. In 1928, however,
section 455 was enacted requiring that a foundation be laid. The courts
then held that section 455 "does not purport to regulate the order of
92. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75 (1942).
93. E.g., FED. R. EVID. 104; United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701 n.14
(1974); Maguire & Epstein, Preliminary Questions of Fact in Determining the Ad-
missibility of Evidence, 40 HARV. L. REV. 392 (1927).
94. State v. Kaufman, 331 So. 2d 16 (La. 1976); State v. Carter, 326 So. 2d 848
(La. 1975); State v. Brown, 326 So. 2d 839 (La. 1975).
95. But see State v. Carter, 326 So. 2d 848, 854 (La. 1975) (plurality dictum):
"[t]he rule requiring a prima facie showing of conspiracy prerequisite to admitting
evidence ....
96. State v. Banks, 40 La. Ann. 736, 5 So. 18 (1888); State v. Adams, 40 La.
Ann. 213, 3 So. 733 (1888); State v. Buchanan, 35 La. Ann. 89 (1883); State v.
Hogan, 3 La. Ann. 714 (1848).
97. "[I]t is true the general rule of law is the declaration of a coconspirator is to
be received only after the conspiracy is established .... "State v. Bolden, 109
La. 484, 33 So. 571 (1903).
98. Id., 33 So. at 572.
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proof," which is within the trial judge's discretion.99 While this interpreta-
tion of section 455 is technically correct, the courts never considered the
statute which does purport to regulate the order of proof, article 773 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure: "when the evidence requires a foundation
for its admission, the foundation must be laid before the evidence is
admissible."100 It is of no consequence that section 455 requires a founda-
tion for the "effect" of the evidence, rather than for its "admission,"
because without such effect it is inadmissible hearsay.' 0' Even beyond the
foregoing statutory analysis, considerations of judicial efficiency militate
against the philosophy of the "order of proof" cases. These decisions
were based on the efficacy of the instruction to disregard, which is more
easily accomplished than a hearing in the jury's absence to determine the
sufficiency of the foundation. In the wake of Bruton this reasoning is no
longer sound. 102 Inculpatory hearsay that does not fall within an exception
to the hearsay rule may violate the defendant's right to confrontation,
requiring mistrial or reversal.10 3 In light of the doubt expressed in Dutton
as to the constitutionality of a comparatively minor deviation from the
traditional coconspirator exception,I° 4 it is unlikely that admission of such
hearsay without the necessary foundation could survive constitutional
scrutiny.' 05
Judicial determination of the existence of a prima facie case of
conspiracy could be obtained at any point in the state's case before the
invocation of section 455, by removing the jury. It could, perhaps, be
more efficiently accomplished in advance of trial. 106 If it is decided that
99. E.g., State v. Cryer, 262 La. 575, 263 So. 2d 895 (1972); State v. Courtney,
170 La. 314, 127 So. 735 (1930); State v. Swindall, 129 La. 760, 56 So. 702 (1911).
100. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 773. It was originally enacted, in slightly different
form, as article 368 of the 1928 Code and carried over as R.S. 15:368 until 1966.
101. LA. R.S. 15:434 (1950) (general exclusion of hearsay). But see State v.
Carter, 326 So. 2d 848, 855 (La. 1975) (Sanders, C.J., dissenting).
102. See the text at note 74, supra.
103. See State v. Kaufman, 331 So. 2d 16, 27 (La. 1976) (Tate, J., concurring).
The court has excluded inculpatory statements of codefendants. State v. Herman,
304 So. 2d 322 (La. 1974). There is no reason to treat differently statements of
persons not on trial which are wrongfully admitted under section 455 (no foundation
established).
104. See notes 67-70, supra.
105. This is especially true in Louisiana since the supreme court has rejected the
harmless error doctrine (apparently relied upon in Dutton, see notes 70 & 71,
supra) for Bruton violations, State v. Herman, 304 So. 2d 322 (La. 1975); State v.
Michelli, 301 So. 2d 577 (La. 1974).
106. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-
Pretrial Criminal Procedure, 37 LA. L. REV. 535, 550 (1977).
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coconspirators' statements should be discoverable,' 0 7 a device similar to
the motion to suppress could be adopted. It has been suggested that "the
state has as much interest as the defendant in knowing in advance of trial
whether a co-conspirator's statement will be admitted." 108 Nonetheless, if
the state is concerned about exposing its case in advance of trial, the
hearing could be held immediately prior to the voir dire or at some other
convenient time.1°9 By delaying the hearing, however, the state would
have to forego any mention of conspiracy during voir dire and in its
opening statement. 10
Nor can it be objected that this imposes too great a burden on the
criminal justice system. The legislature foreclosed that argument in 1928,
and Bruton found that even a new trial was not excessive cure. Moreover,
it must be remembered that the state is initially required to prove only a
prima facie case. Logically the standard should be much higher,"' for it is
inherent in the traditional exception that the defendant has no remedy
when the judge finds a prima facie case but the hearsay is decisive in the
jury's ultimate finding that a conspiracy exists. Nonetheless, the legisla-
tion is clear on this point and there is no indication that the constitution
requires more.
State v. Carter"12 held that a showing that two or more persons
committed the crime charged does not establish a prima facie case of
conspiracy. Some evidence of an agreement must be found, though it is
well established that it can be inferred from circumstantial evidence." 3
The most appropriate standard of proof is that amount necessary to sustain
a verdict of guilt on a charge of conspiracy, i.e., to dismiss defendant's
motion for a directed verdict.' 14 The existence of the conspiracy would
107. Cf. State v. Babin, 319 So. 2d 367, 374-77 (La. 1975) (disclosure of wit-
ness's prior statements) (Tate, J., concurring on original hearing).
108. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-
Pretrial Criminal Procedure, 37 LA. L. REV. 535, 550 (1977).
109. This might also eliminate the need to call the witnesses on two different
days. But see note 117, infra (for defendant's ability to obtain an earlier hearing via
motion to suppress).
110. See the text at note 118, infra.
111. Davenport, supra note 22, at 1389 (perhaps even "beyond a reasonable
doubt").
112. 326 So. 2d 848, 854 (La. 1975).
113. Compare State v. Brown, 326 So. 2d 839, 847 (La. 1975) (Calogero, J.,
dissenting) with State v. Carter, 326 So. 2d 848, 856 (La. 1975) (Sanders, J.,
dissenting).
114. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 267 at 645 n.26. See United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 701 n. 14 (1974). This standard is based upon the jury's having to find a
conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt to use the exception, State v. Gebbia, 121
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then truly be a question for the jury and the judge would never be required
to overturn this finding.
In addition to establishment of the statutory foundation, the state
should be required to give defendant notice, before its opening statement,
of any inculpatory statements of coconspirators that it intends to offer." 
5
If the declarations of coconspirators are to be imputed to each of them
because of an implied agency, then certainly the defendant should receive
the notice to which his "agent" would be entitled. Notice of inculpatory
statements is required under article 768 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
to lessen the arbitrary impact of surprise upon one's ability to defend
himself. 1 6 The alleged conspirator's need for such protection is even
greater because he may be completely unaware of his "agent's" state-
ments. If the defendant does know of these statements, he should be able
to require a hearing before trial by use of the motion to suppress. " 7 By the
same token, the state should not be allowed to "advert in any way"
(including discussion of section 455) to the existence of these declarations
in its opening statement, unless a prima facie case of conspiracy has
already been established. "'
This Comment has concentrated on the admissibility of evidence, but
recently the courts have become embroiled in a dispute over the propriety
of arguing the law of conspiracy to the jury when the state intends to
invoke section 455 in a trial for the completed offense. The danger to the
defendant is twofold: increased likelihood of guilt by association, and the
possibility that a confused jury will convict for the basic offense if they
believe defendant guilty of conspiracy. In 1967, the supreme court re-
versed itself on rehearing and held that a charge on all aspects of the law of
La. 1083, 1105-06, 47 So. 32, 40 (1908), which should be the meaning of the oft-cited
"to the satisfaction of the jury." E.g., State v. Courtney, 170 La. 314, 127 So. 735
(1930); State v. Brasseaux, 163 La. 686, 112 So. 650 (1927). Therefore, to establish a
prima facie case the judge need only find that a reasonable man could find conspira-
cy beyond a reasonable doubt.
115. It is also arguable that defendant is entitled to the notice outlined in State v.
Prieur, 277 So. 2d 126, 130 (La. 1973) (see Comment, Other Crimes Evidence in
Louisiana, 33 LA. L. REV. 614,628 n.76 (1973)), because conspiracy is separate and
distinct from the completed offense (see LA. CODE CRIM. P. art 814 (not a respon-
sive verdict) and LA. R.S. 14:26 (1950) (not bar to prosecution for basic offense)).
Comment, Coconspirators, 2 So. U.L. REV. 128 (1975).
116. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 769, comment (c)(2).
117. Id. art. 703B (inculpatory statements).
118. Id. art. 767. The policy underlying the article is that no mention of the
inculpatory statement should be made because the defendant may succeed in
excluding it at trial. After the foundation is established there is no chance of
exclusion of the statement.
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conspiracy was not only not prejudicial, it was mandatory when section
455 was invoked in a trial for the completed offense. 119 This was extended
the next year to allow the state to question prospective jurors about
conspiracy law on voir dire. The theory was that the trial would involve
these issues because of section 455 and such questioning could reveal the
"juror's ability to act intelligently in the case."' 20 In 1974, the state was
allowed to explain the law of conspiracy in its opening statement even
though "it might have been irrelevant." The court was careful to note that
the prejudicial effect had not been compounded by a jury charge on
conspiracy. 121
The prosecution pushed the problem to the limit in three cases in
1975 and 1976. 122 Conspiracy law was discussed on voir dire, opening and
closing statements, and in the jury charge. The result is that references to
the law of conspiracy are permissible in a trial for the basic offense on voir
dire and in the opening statement if more than one person is charged with
the crime (though not necessarily in one trial) and the state intends to use
section 455. It is permissible in closing arguments and in the jury charge
only if a prima facie case has been made. 123
In conjunction with the hearing suggested above, references to con-
spiracy should be allowed only after a prima facie showing has been made.
Before that time, it is not "the law applicable to the case" as required for
argument 24 and clearly should not be charged to the jury.
Conclusion
The coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule is devoid of sound
theoretical basis. The relative rarity of its use in actual conspiracy trials
belies the claim of necessity. Nor do declarations of coconspirators pos-
sess guarantees of reliability when not within some other recognized
hearsay exception. Nonetheless, use of the rule continues virtually unchal-
lenged. Until such time as the legislature remedies its abuses, the courts
119. State v. Skinner, 251 La. 300, 204 So. 2d 370 (1967), cert. dismissed, 393
U.S. 473 (1969). See State v. Capaci, 179 La. 462, 154 So. 419 (1934).
120. State v. Schoonover, 252 La. 311, 315-18, 211 So. 2d 273, 275 (1968).
121. State v. Dotch, 298 So. 2d 742 (La. 1974).
122. See note 94, supra.
123. State v. Kaufman, 331 So. 2d 16, 21 (La. 1976). References to conspiracy
during closing arguments were held permissible in Brown if there is any evidence of
conspiracy. 326 So. 2d at 843. This was an apparent inadvertence on the part of
Justice Bolin for as recognized in Kaufman, conspiracy is not a part of the "law
applicable to the case" until a prima facie case is established.
124. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 774.
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should strive to contain the exception strictly within its statutory bounds.
Not only the substantive law of conspiracy, but also its evidence law




125. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCEss 51 (1921) quoted in
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).

